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Abstract 
Over the last decade, both the availability of quantitative indicators on labor market 
institutions and of studies trying to explain differences in national labor market per-
formance through institutional variables have burgeoned significantly. It is now time 
to review these indicators and the empirical findings. Therefore, this paper has a 
threefold objective: First, we provide an overview of the aggregate indicators of core 
labor market institutions such as employment protection, the generosity of the bene-
fit system, active labor market policies, taxation and collective bargaining. We as-
sess the reliability of selected indicators. Second, we review the most relevant 
macro-econometric studies that made use of these indicators in order to explain 
diverging patterns of national employment performance. Third, and finally, this paper 
draws some preliminary conclusions regarding the further development of aggregate 
indicators and possible directions for future empirical research. 
 







The authors are grateful to participants of the IZA/Fondazione Rudolfo DeBenedetti 
workshop on the measurement of labor market institutions, 4 July 2007, for helpful 
comments as well as for the discussion at the Paris School of Economics research 
seminar, 11 February 2008, in particular Elvire Guillaud.  
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1  Introduction 
In recent years, attempts at explaining diverging patterns of labor market perform-
ance have received considerable attention, and not only in economics and the social 
sciences. From a policy perspective, evidence on causal factors that influence the 
levels and structures of employment and unemployment is relevant in order to in-
form policy-making in the labor market field. Most of the comparative research 
points at the crucial role played by complex, multi-dimensional institutional arrange-
ments in different policy areas that have either direct or indirect influence on the 
labor market. Hence, institution-oriented research contributes to explaining varia-
tions in employment performance across countries and over time and helps identify 
more or less successful institutional arrangements and reform strategies. 
Research into the causes and consequences of labor market institutions (LMI) first 
concentrated on qualitative issues, including narrative descriptions and comparative 
analysis. However, due to the general advancement of quantitative research, the 
measurement of labor market institutions became more and more important. Quanti-
tative research depends on reliable summary indicators. Constructing indices, how-
ever, is not an easy task, even if all the necessary data is available. In empirical 
work, however, the provision of data, in particular for the construction of long time 
series, is the greater challenge. The construction of indices has been a controversial 
issue, and the debate is still going on. While the production of indices can be seen 
as a research topic of its own, it is certainly more interesting to discuss the applica-
tion of indices in econometric studies. And it appears that the debate on the correct 
measurement of labor market institutions has been fuelled by these applications. 
If our understanding of labor market outcomes, unemployment being the most 
prominent one, can be seen as an interaction of “facts and ideas”, as Blanchard 
(2006) put it, then quantitative research into the effects of labor market institutions 
can be seen as the interaction between the construction and the application of indi-
cators. Ten years after the publication of Nickell’s (1997) very influential paper on 
the institutional differences between Europe and North America, we think that it is 
time to review indicators and empirical findings, and to assess the state of knowl-
edge. This sort of stock-taking is similar to – and in some respect inspired by – that 
of Blanchard (2006). While Blanchard presents the big picture, we focus on indica-
tors and empirical research on the effects of labor market institutions on unemploy-
ment. 
2  How research into the effects of labor market institutions 
took off 
Indicators of labor market institutions have been used intensively in macro-econo-
metric studies on the causes of unemployment since roughly ten years. However, in 
the theoretical and the descriptive part of the empirical literature institutions are cer-
tainly known for at least 20 years. Earlier research had focused on the role of mac- 
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roeconomic shocks experienced by most industrialized countries in the 1970s and 
1980s. Nominal and real wage rigidities determined by different wage-setting ar-
rangements were the most important explanatory variable. Given the fact that per-
sistent differences in unemployment levels could be observed even after the shocks, 
research on the role of other labor market institutions became more prominent 
(Blanchard 2006).  
This interest was spurred by theoretical research on the relationship between institu-
tions and labor market performance. Although the fundamentals were laid in the 
seminal work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), it took a couple of  years be-
fore the notion of “labor market institutions” eventually entered into the language of 
economists and found broad acceptance, as expressed by the entry into the Hand-
book of Labor Economics (Nickell and Layard 1999). 
2.1  Theoretical aspects 
Institutions affect labor market outcomes through the price and wage setting proc-
esses that, in turn, influence labor supply, labor demand and the matching between 
workers and available jobs via flows of labor. Effective wage and price setting allows 
for the wage adjustment required by business cycle variations or structural changes 
and enhance the mobility of labor from declining to growing sectors. Adverse labor 
market institutions inhibit these processes and can therefore explain higher unem-
ployment.  
According to this approach, which has become known as “deregulatory view” (e.g. 
Baccaro/Rei 2005), labor market performance is to be explained by a core set of five 
labor market institutions: 
1. One of the most classical explanatory factors is the wage setting arrangement 
due to its direct influence on wage flexibility in terms of nominal and real rigidities 
and wage dispersion. In terms of institutions, the extent of unionization, coverage 
by collective agreements or binding minimum wages and the degree of centrali-
zation and coordination of wage bargaining through corporatist arrangements are 
the most relevant features. Wage adjustment is often seen as particularly efficient 
in decentralized bargaining structures with most wages being set at the individual 
or enterprise level due to the direct consideration of market forces or in a central-
ized and coordinated fashion which facilitates wage moderation. Hence, regard-
ing wage moderation and wage flexibility there can be advantages for both cen-
tralized and decentralized regimes. Wage dispersion is assumed to be more pro-
nounced in decentralized regimes with low bargaining coverage and low or non-
existing binding minimum wages.  
2. Unemployment benefits, i.e. passive labor market policies, provide income re-
placement in case of non-employment. In a wider sense, this not only comprises 
unemployment insurance, but also unemployment and social assistance and dif- 
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ferent forms of disability pensions and early retirement schemes. Through the 
provision of income replacement, unemployment benefits can provide some hu-
man capital insurance for qualified workers in the early phase of unemployment. 
However, unemployment benefits may reduce job search intensity and labor sup-
ply by presenting negative work incentives and raising the reservation wage as 
they provide an implicit wage floor.  
3. Active labor market policies can facilitate a better matching on the labor market 
through placement support, raise productivity through publicly sponsored training 
and compensate for productivity deficits via hiring subsidies. By improving the 
human capital of the unemployed and intensifying job searches through tight 
monitoring, they can increase competition on the labor market, help avoid bottle-
necks and facilitate wage moderation. The use of active schemes for activation 
helps counter potential work disincentives stemming from generous unemploy-
ment benefits. However, ineffective labor market policies can hamper employ-
ment performance given negative tax effects.  
4. Taxes on labor, in particular non-wage labor costs resulting from social insurance 
contributions, can reduce labor demand and labor supply. The extent of this ef-
fect depends on the actual tax burden of employers and/or employees taking into 
account wage adjustments. Negative effects are more probable in the case of 
low-wage jobs where non-wage labor costs are not borne by the worker but by 
the employer since the benefit system works as an effective wage floor.  
5. Employment protection, i.e. provisions on dismissal protection and restrictions on 
temporary employment and temporary work agencies, can influence the adapta-
tion processes by raising layoff and hiring costs. While on the one hand stabiliz-
ing jobs and setting incentives for training, this can hamper adjustment to 
changes by reducing mobility in the labor market. Given the protection of regular 
employees, employment protection can lead to stronger wage pressure from la-
bor market insiders. Employment protection can reduce the reemployment oppor-
tunities of outsiders and entrants and deepen labor market segmentation.  
In the “institutions matter”-model, however, the general assumptions are, first, that 
core labor market institutions in principle work in isolation from each other and do 
not form complex institutional arrangements in their interactions between each other 
or other, non-labor market institutions. The second assumption is that there is an 
optimal institutional setting that is close to the perfect functioning of market mecha-
nisms so that differences in unemployment performance can basically be explained 
by the fact that countries’ labor market institutions deviate more or less from this 
optimal arrangement. Hence, this method of analyzing labor markets assumes that 
there is a single peak of superior performance that is close to the market, i.e. where 
wage and price setting mechanisms work without much disturbance. Policy advice 
then calls for increasing flexibility over all institutional parameters.   
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2.2  Early econometric work 
At the empirical research frontier, the contributions by Nickell (1997) and Elmeskov, 
Martin and Scarpetta (1998)
1 mark the beginning of a debate that has been going 
on since then. Nickell (1997) starts out from the “received wisdom” that European 
labor markets are rigid and inflexible and tries to find empirical evidence on the ad-
verse effects of “labor market rigidities,” as institutions were often named at this 
time. His analysis can be seen as a blueprint for other studies. He runs regressions 
of labor market institutions on unemployment and employment rates, using two 
cross sections. His data set is thus quite small (NT=40) and apart from the change 
in inflation his explaining variables only include labor market institutions. Nickell’s 
results support the view that generous unemployment benefits, high unionization 
and union coverage without wage bargaining co-ordination, and high taxes on labor 
lead to higher unemployment rates. Employment protection has no significant effect 
on unemployment. Active labor market policies reduce unemployment. 
Elmeskov et al. (1998) go a little further by studying the interaction between institu-
tions and (active) labor market policies in more detail. They also discuss the political 
economy of labor market reforms, a line of research that has regularly been dealt 
with in the context of labor market institutions and (un-)employment performance. 
While their sample is almost identical to the one used by Nickell, they use yearly 
data covering the time span from 1983 up to 1995 (NT=238). Different panel models 
are estimated, confirming mostly a priori expectations on the signs of coefficients. 
An important difference to Nickell (1997) is a positive and significant coefficient for 
employment protection. While Nickell only stresses interactions between unem-
ployment benefits and active labor market policies on the one hand and union power 
and centralized bargaining on the other, Elmeskov et al. (1998) also analyze interac-
tions between employment protection and unemployment benefits or centralization. 
They also include interaction terms for taxes and centralization. Regressions, how-
ever, including both institutions on their own and their interactions with each other, 
easily result in many insignificant estimates. Since Elmeskov et al. (1998) only re-
port their experiences with interaction terms selectively, their results should be seen 
as tentative hints that institutions probably interact. 
2.3  Measurement of institutions 
It is rather obvious that research into the effects of labour market institutions had 
long been hindered by the lack of available data. In their “Multi-Country Study”, dat-
ing back to 1986, Bean, Layard and Nickell for instance note that “deriving series 
that adequately capture the multi-dimensional complexity of the benefit system for 
all 18 countries is a truly Herculean task which is well beyond the scope of this ex-
                                                  
1   The paper by Elemeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) draws heavily from an earlier con-
tribution by Scarpetta (1996).  
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ercise” (p. S7). This sort of reluctance, which was probably shared by many re-
searchers at that time, changed into a more active stance during the 1990s. One 
might be willing to recognise the OECD Job Study (1994a) in combination with the 
OECD Employment Outlook of the same year (1994b) as the breakthrough. How-
ever, it is probably more appropriate to see the Jobs Study as the final impetus, 
since a lot of data actually used in Nickell’s 1997 study was drawn from other 
sources. 
The book by Layard, Nickell and Jackman, which appeared in 1991, is another ma-
jor contribution to the development of research into the effects of LMI. The volume 
includes information on unemployment benefits and wage-setting systems in 19 
OECD countries that is quite similar to the variables used in later studies. The 
econometric strategy of LNJ is different from subsequent approaches by estimating 
price and wage equations firstly before explaining the “unemployment parameter” of 
the wage equation by benefits and wage-setting variables.  
A little earlier than Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Lazear (1990) gathered 
data on employment protection. His study had a big influence on further research 
into the effects of labour market legislation. It also demonstrated the possible gains 
of time series on institutional variables. The subsequent development of research 
shows evolutionary features. Most studies drew on existing data, but also added 
some additional series. The “Labour Market Institutions Database” set up by Nickell 
and Nunziata in the late 1990s nicely shows the piecemeal character. There data 
from many different sources, including contributions by e.g. Lazear (1990), Blanch-
ard and Wolfers (2000), and Oswald (1996) is assembled. 
The OECD has certainly played a crucial role in setting the scene for quantitative 
research. By being willing to create and maintain institutional data sets it has taken 
the role of the producer of a public good. Particularly in fields like the measurement 
of tax burdens it had been the OECD that took on the “Herculean task” and gathered 
huge amounts of information and condensed it into handy indicators.  
3  Indicators 
Generally speaking, indicators can be quantitative or qualitative measures that cap-
ture observable facts in a country over time and thereby show a country's standing 
in relation to others or to other periods of time. As such, they are used to assess 
and predict the performance of the economy. This section reviews indicators that 
describe labor market institutions. They are defined as “generally known rules that 
are designed to give structure to the recurring interactions in the labor market” 
(Ochel 2005).  
In this section, we review major institutions and attempts to measure them; that is, 
we focus on the right-hand side of the regression equation. We do not aim at provid-
ing a complete list of all existing indicators. Only those indicators will be mentioned  
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that are most frequently used in empirical studies and that serve to illustrate how 
they are constructed.  
3.1  General aspects 
Labor market institutions have many dimensions. Relevant information can be quali-
tative or quantitative. Of course, the latter case is easier to deal with because we 
can tell numbers apart. It is more difficult to handle qualitative information. For em-
pirical analysis, this information has to be quantified. As a first step, information 
must be grouped and common denominators need to be defined. Since we are in-
terested in knowing something about relative positions, the next step involves rank-
ordering the groups. For this, we must have some concept of intensity or signifi-
cance in mind. As a result, we get an ordinal measure. If we stop here, we assume 
implicitly that relative intensities are the same for all ranks. To circumvent this short-
coming, a cardinal measure can be created. For this purpose, we need a scoring 
system to make judgments about institutional features' relative intensities.  
Single-dimensioned institutions are the easiest to deal with. But most often, labor 
market institutions have many facets and are measured along many different di-
mensions. We then have detailed indicators with each capturing only one part of the 
whole picture. The problem is how to condense the information available in order to 
better grasp the overall picture. This relates to problems of constructing composite 
indicators. It basically involves the same steps as above. Additionally, we have to 
find a way to aggregate the detailed indicators into one indicator. To do this, we 
have to assign weights to the detailed indicators. The detailed indicators then enter 
the composite indicator additively; other approaches are possible. As a general rule, 
the choice of weights should be guided by the relative importance of each detailed 
indicator. What we regard as relatively more or less important is a question of eco-
nomic theory or statistical analysis. Weights are often simply based on subjective 
judgments. 
Information on labor market institutions comes from many sources such as national 
legislation, expert reviews and national or international statistical offices and other 
bodies. The comparability of data is especially impaired in a cross-country context. 
Statistical offices, for instance, apply different definitions and standards that may 
also change over time. Whether information about the labor market is comparable or 
standardized across countries and over time is questionable. Thus, all forms of 
measurement errors can arise. Where information is only insufficiently available, 
researchers sometimes need to fill in the gaps. A variety of methods are at the dis-
posal of researchers, though none are free of further assumptions that change the 
data sets interpretation. 
Indicators exist for almost all labor market institutions. They differ with respect to the 
number of countries and time periods covered. Data is mostly available for OECD 
countries from the 1970s onwards.   
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3.2  Employment protection  
The construction of employment protection legislation (EPL) indicators has seen 
different stages. In the beginning, Lazear (1990) was the first to link EPL to unem-
ployment and other labor market outcomes. He used weeks of notice and severance 
pay as a proxy for EPL. Addison and Grosso (1996) revised Lazear’s data.  
Later, Grubb and Wells (1993) built the first composite indicator. They identified 
several dimensions of EPL and assigned scores to them. Using a rank of averaged 
rank procedure they obtained a first ordinal measure. The OECD (1994a, 1999, 
2004) proceeded in the same fashion but adopted a different aggregation scheme 
for the 18 detailed indicators and came up with weights based on subjective reason-
ing. To obtain a time series, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) had to interpolate be-
tween the OECD data points for the late 1980s and 1990s and used Lazear's proxy 
to finally offer data covering the time period 1960-1999. Using Blanchard and Wolf-
ers' data, Nickell et al. (2003) annualized the data points. Nickell (1997) uses the 
OECD (1994a) series on employment protection and labour standards which also 
enter the Elmeskov et al. (1998) study. The latter also includes updates for the 
1990s as summarized in OECD (1997a). Belot and van Ours (2001) build their own 
index by grading several aspects of protection for three types of jobs: open-ended 
contracts, fixed-term contracts, and temporary work agencies. 
While the OECD until recently only provided data points for the late 1980s, late 
1990s and 2004, the update of the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 2006) was substanti-
ated with the first “true” time series with annual data on employment protection legis-
lation based upon information on reforms (Brandt/Burniaux/Duval 2005). Brandt et 
al. look at the period 1985-2003 and provide separate scores for EPL regarding 
temporary and permanent employment. Based on the OECD methodology and scor-
ing system, Allard (2005a) reviews EPL changes and derives time-series for OECD 
countries, based on the ILO's International Encyclopedia for Labor Law and Indus-
trial Relations and offers country scores for 1950-2003 at the aggregate level.  
The latest approach is by Amable et al. (2007). They also use the OECD data as a 
starting point. To fill the gaps, they look at the Social Reforms Database maintained 
by the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (FRDB) that collects information on labor 
market reforms and assesses their impact to see whether they have increased or 
decreased the flexibility of the system. The authors run OLS regressions with this 
data to predict the evolution of the EPL indicator between 1980 and 2004. What may 
bring this approach's validity into question is that the data set does not only include 
information on employment protection legislation but also on reforms of working time 
or wage setting institutions. Moreover, it is not always possible to exactly assign the 
18 OECD EPL categories to the information provided. It is, for instance, hard to ar-
gue that changes in wage setting institutions contain information which can be used 
for the construction of the EPL indicator.   
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This last issue refers to the quest for a time series of EPL. There are Blanchard and 
Wolfers, Nickell et al., Allard, Brandt et al., and Amable et al., all trying to provide a 
complete panel. Neither Blanchard and Wolfers nor Nickell et al. offer arguments as 
to why their indicators are sufficiently reliable for use in empirical studies. Allard's 
and Brandt et al.’s approach are the most fruitful since they rely on raw data. There-
fore, we do not see any alternative to the regular update of the OECD data in order 
to extend the time series. Only painstaking work by referring to labor laws and other 
sources can accomplish this task. Any attempts apart from that are “rough approxi-
mations” that are used for empirical studies as a basis for “rough” policy recommen-
dations. 
Several issues with the existing approaches remain. All existing indicators share the 
feature that they follow a de jure approach. Their respective constructors look at 
codified rules or surveys of them and from these they determine the strictness of the 
rules. So far no EPL indicators are available that take up a de facto approach (see 
Bertola et al. (2000) for a discussion of this issue). 
The indicators also do not include non-legislated forms of employment protection. 
EPL can be agreed upon in individual contracts or can be one outcome of a collec-
tive bargaining arrangement. 
3.3  Taxation 
The literature identifies three different approaches to measure the tax burden: i) rep-
resentative worker models, ii) aggregate/macroeconomic data, iii) microsimulation 
models. Relevant taxes include payroll taxes, social security contributions and in-
come taxes dependent on workers’ pay. The inclusion of consumption taxes and 
taxes on capital income is controversial and the same holds for the question of 
whether to allow for employers’ voluntary contributions.  
In its publication “Taxing Wages” the OECD uses models to assess the tax burden 
on labor on an annual basis.
2 The strategy is fairly simple: It identifies an individual 
called average production worker who works full-time in the manufacturing sector 
and earns an average wage. This worker may claim different tax reliefs and benefits 
depending on the personal circumstances such as marriage and children. For each 
country, the OECD then applies the tax code and thus computes the worker’s net 
income. The OECD repeats the same analysis for different family types and income 
levels. From this data, it is easy to compute several relations, most importantly the 
tax wedge which is used as a proxy for the tax burden on labor in empirical studies.  
The second approach uses macroeconomic data. From national accounts one ex-
tracts numbers on tax revenues and expresses them as a ratio of some defined ag-
                                                  
2   The same holds true for “Benefits and Wages” where benefits are also included.  
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gregate tax base. The question left to the researcher is what to include in the nu-
merator and denominator of these aggregate average tax rates. Available indicators 
differ widely with respect to this, and, as a consequence, in magnitude. However, all 
indicators tend in the same direction and display high positive correlations (see De 
Haan et al. (2003) for further details). Early econometric work on the effects of LMI 
(Nickell 1997, Elmeskov et al. 1998) mostly used OECD data derived by using the 
macro approach.  
The third approach relies on microsimulation models based on household survey 
data. The European Commission has set up a comprehensive tax/benefit model 
called EUROMOD that covers 15 member countries. Sutherland (2001) provides a 
detailed documentation of this model. 
Both microeconomic approaches differ in the way income is calculated. On the one 
hand, Taxing Wages takes a representative agent's gross wage earnings - only one 
individual is considered. Euromod, on the other, uses household surveys, for in-
stance the German Socio Economic Panel, to derive its data on household income. 
In this sense, Euromod is based on a richer information set than Taxing Wages. 
Simulated and actual tax burden differ. There is no evidence of the difference's sign 
and its magnitude. Given household income as an input, EUROMOD reports new 
income levels resulting from a changing policy environment. A major drawback of 
this method is that tax rules may be applied too mechanically. In essence, this 
charge also applies to the model-based approach. Everything that is non-standard is 
not sufficiently captured by the two approaches. 
To study the incentive effects of taxes we need marginal taxes – especially at the 
extensive margin, i.e. whether to enter the labor market or not. Macro-based tax 
rates cannot provide this measure. In this case, micro- and model-based ap-
proaches prove useful. To derive marginal tax rates, McKee et al. (1986) use a rep-
resentative worker approach, Immervoll (2004) applies EUROMOD and Carone et 
al. (2004) use the OECD’s Benefits and Wages approach. 
3.4  Benefit Generosity  
The generosity of the unemployment protection system, i.e. unemployment insur-
ance and assistance as well as welfare, refers to the unemployment replacement 
rate, the duration of entitlement, other eligibility criteria that specify insurance cover-
age and recipients, and to availability rules that define search effort requirements 
and the suitability of a job offer. Finally, the system has various sanction mecha-
nisms available should a claimant not fulfill certain requirements and conditions. All 
of these different dimensions together make up the system's generosity and, 
thereby, an unemployed individual's welfare.  
The measurement of the replacement rate is subject to the same problems as the 
Taxing Wages approach. There is not one single replacement rate that applies to all  
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workers. In addition, workers are entitled to receive benefits for varying periods of 
time depending on other labor market characteristics such as age or the length of 
the previous employment period.  
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) construct their series of benefit duration and 
replacement rates from statutory rules. The same method underlies the data in 
Nickell’s (1997) study, while Elmeskov et al. (1998) use a summary measure, pro-
vided by the OECD, which condenses replacement rates for three family situations 
and three duration categories into one single index number. 
The OECD calculates replacement rates for different representative workers, 
household compositions and earnings levels. Applying the specific country rules 
gives a gross replacement rate. The OECD, however, also calculates net (after tax) 
replacement rates in order to take differences in the national tax and benefit sys-
tems into account. 
It has become evident that it is insufficient to only look at the replacement rate. 
Rather, we need to include more dimensions of UI's generosity. Allard (2005b) cal-
culates an indicator that captures both the gross replacement rate, taxes on bene-
fits, the duration of collecting benefits and eligibility criteria. The last point has been 
researched by the Danish Ministry of Finance (1998, Hasselpflug 2005). It conducts 
a survey and asks for the conditions that the unemployed must meet in order to col-
lect benefits. Scores assigned to eight categories, subjectively weighted, give an 
overall indicator. Yet, this indicator is less than conclusive with respect to the country 
ranking.  
Scruggs (2006) adopts a different approach. He calculates an expected welfare 
benefit that is the product of the income replacement and coverage rate of three 
social security regimes: unemployment, sickness and pensions. As such, the meas-
ure looks not only at the UI system. Yet, the approach by Scruggs is helpful as it 
takes coverage into account. In a similar fashion, Vroman (2007) calculates benefit 
generosity as the ratio of annual unemployment compensation payments, i.e. un-
employment insurance and assistance, to the average number of recipients normal-
ized by average wages.  
3.5  Active Labor Market Policies 
In order to better assess active labor market programs, OECD Employment Out-
looks and European Commission publications annually report numbers on partici-
pants and public spending. Since the range of programs is extremely wide, there are 
eight categories that capture the dimensions of active labor market policies. Only 
targeted programs are included, that is, only measures to fight current or prospec-
tive unemployment are considered. The numbers are expressed as GDP ratios or as 
expenditure per unemployed person. The tables mostly report gross numbers – that 
is, taxes and other deductions are not taken into consideration.  
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In empirical work, ALMP is typically measured as expenditures per person relative to 
GDP per capita (e.g. Elmeskov et al. 1998) or relative to GDP per member of the 
labour force (Nickell 1997). The spending ratios and numbers of participants do not 
provide us with information on the programs' success. This is the aim of evaluation 
studies. Expenditure data on active labor market policies cannot shed light on the 
potential use of active schemes for activation purposes, i.e. making benefits de-
pendent upon participation in training measures and public employment offers. Ex-
penditure data does not allow for the interpretation of active schemes either as “be-
nevolent” supporting measures or “work test” programs. Hence, they cannot be 
taken as a proxy for activation.  
3.6  Wage Setting 
Wage setting in a broader sense refers to how employees and employers can de-
cide on the terms of their labor relations. Those terms comprise questions of wage-
setting, working time and procedures, health and safety regulations or even forms of 
employment protection. The literature usually concentrates on wage-setting issues, 
which are studied under four headings: i) trade union density, ii) collective bargain-
ing coverage, iii) centralization and iv) coordination. Obtaining numbers on i) and ii) 
is relatively easy compared to iii) and iv) the reason being that union density and 
coverage are already expressed in numerical terms. Measures of corporatism, i.e. 
centralization and coordination in the wage bargaining process, involve subjective 
judgments that may give rise to measurement problems.  
The study of wage setting institutions usually starts by looking at the union density. 
It gives a measure of unions' presence in the labor market and of their strength to 
give voice to their demands. Union density is defined as the ratio of active and/or 
inactive union members and employed workers. The net union density adjusts for 
active members and is mostly used in empirical studies. Based on Visser's calcula-
tions using the model set up by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), the OECD Employ-
ment Outlooks (2004, 1997, 1994b) provide numbers. Data exists for the 1970s, 
1980s, 1990s and 2000 for almost all OECD countries.  
A union-negotiated contract gets the more weight the more it applies to non-union 
members and non-affiliated employers as well. This is summarized by collective 
bargaining coverage. Beyond this, it can be implemented by extension and 
enlargement mechanisms. Extension mechanisms rule that a collective agreement 
is binding within a sector or region regardless of whether employers participate in 
the wage-setting process. Enlargement goes beyond this and specifies that the col-
lective agreement is binding in other sectors or regions. Brandt et al. (2005) con-
struct an indicator that accounts for extensions and enlargement. Coming from labor 
force surveys, the European Industrial Relations Observatory and other official re-
ports, the OECD provides numbers on collective bargaining coverage. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to precisely factor out the coverage rate due to extension or 
enlargement mechanisms.   
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Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) used data from McCallum (1983) on union den-
sity covering the time from 1965 to 1977. They also compiled data on coverage, 
centralization, and co-ordination drawing on many different sources. This informa-
tion set was used by Nickell (1997) who also refers to OECD (1994b) figures. 
Centralization and coordination are measures of corporatism. Basically, the centrali-
zation indicator should account for the bargaining level itself, the share of the work-
force whose wages are determined at the corresponding level and the degree of 
horizontal centralization (Kenworthy 2001). Negotiations can occur at any level from 
the firm to the industry and up to the national level. Moreover – and this makes the 
whole quantification exercise complicated – multiple levels with varying authority 
may be involved in the process. Iversen (1999) tries to improve the incorporation of 
the connections between the different levels by assigning weights to three bargain-
ing authority levels – centralized, intermediate, decentralized – and thereby sheds 
light on the different structural characteristics within the bargaining process. Iversen 
then applies an aggregation scheme that also accounts for union density. Traxler et 
al. (2001) look at the actual level of the bargaining process. They include the influ-
ence of lower levels on the outcome and the share of the workforce covered. Addi-
tionally, they take note of the degree of horizontal centralization. By judging each 
level’s impact on wages on a case-by-case basis, they assign scores to the coun-
tries from a range of twelve points. Each score considers mixtures of bargaining 
levels and accounts for share of workers collectively bound by the corresponding 
bargaining agreement. Additionally, the OECD (2004) provides numbers on five-
year averages from 1970-2000. It identifies five levels of centralization ranging from 
the company/plant level to central-level agreements. 
Wage coordination captures the extent to which low-level bargaining parties are 
able and willing to internalize their actions. Soskice (1990) argues that it is a broader 
concept than centralization. Wage centralization as such is only one means to 
achieve coordination. Other modes include state-imposed centralization, guidance 
of lower levels by peak-level organizations and pattern-setting by a powerful sector 
or group of firms (Kenworthy 2001). Soskice (1990) ranks countries on a five-point 
scale for the late 1980s. Layard/Nickell/Jackman and the OECD, among others, 
adopt this approach as well. As a result, the OECD provides data points from 1970 
to 2000. Following a different track, Traxler et al. (2001) look at the coordination 
activities by the major bargaining partners and put them into six categories. Each of 
the indicators mentioned so far have in common that they aim at measuring the ac-
tual degree of coordination achieved. Kenworthy (2001) adopts a different approach 
and tries to form expectations over the coordination activities by looking at the wage 
setting arrangement. He sets up a database for 18 OECD countries covering the 
time period 1960-2000. In his publication he provides extensive explanations how 
he comes up with his five point scoring scheme. Traxler et al. (2001) do not only 
look at centralization and coordination but also at the extent to which lower-level 
bargaining partners (the rank and file) actually follow the agreements reached at  
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higher levels. In this sense bargaining governability refers to the degree of vertical 
coordination. Using Traxler et al.'s information, the OECD (2004) derives a cardinal 
indicator for 2000. A time series is not available, however, as the OECD argues, we 
may safely assume that practices have not changed in recent years. Composite 
indicators of centralization and coordination usually exclude information on vertical 
coordination. Belot and van Ours (2001) construct a centralization index (1-3) ac-
cording to the privileged level of bargaining using information from Bratt (1996), 
OECD (1997b) and Elmeskov et al. (1998). 
The 1994 OECD Jobs Study suggests a further decentralization of wage bargaining. 
One such measure is to introduce opening or opt-out clauses that give the right to 
companies to re-negotiate collective bargaining agreements at a lower level. Data 
on this is scarce and what is available does not seem to warrant changes in the ex-
isting OECD rankings (OECD 2004). 
So far we have only looked at the employees’ side. Numbers on employers' affilia-
tions are even scarcer. Clearly, these are missing parts of the overall picture of how 
labor market agents organize themselves. 
3.7  Progress toward an overall indicator of labor market flexibil-
ity 
The only attempt at an overall indicator of labor market adaptability so far was pre-
sented by Algoé/Alphametrics (2002) for the EU 15, Japan and the United States. 
This was conceived as a project to develop an indicator that integrated individual 
behavior, institutions and the external context in an interactive way, thus going be-
yond institutional factors and relying mainly on labor market outcome variables. The 
study proposes a set of indices that stand for different dimensions of labor market 
adaptability such as labor availability, education and training, job mobility and work-
ing time flexibility – with some reference being made to institutional variables such 
as employment protection and unemployment insurance benefits. Hence, while this 
allows for interactions between different dimensions of adaptability as well as for 
specific national patterns and country clusters, the approach is not primarily institu-
tional and, in a way, incomplete.  
3.8  Overall Assessment  
Existing indicators try to capture levels of regulation or the reform intensity in the 
labor market. There has been considerable progress regarding the coverage of pol-
icy areas and the creation of time series information on both levels of regulation in-
tensity and changes in terms of reforms.  
Of course, the development of indicators is always a bit arbitrary. Most of them are 
based, at least partially, on subjective judgments and weights or implicitly have 
some economic model in mind. This holds for the inclusion of different elements into 
an aggregate indicator or the weights attached to particular elements. Exactly for  
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this reason some researchers have moved toward tests of robustness or sensitivity 
and discuss the economic implication inherent in the underlying model. A handbook 
for constructing composite indicators (Nardo 2005) offers helpful guidelines to as-
sess the statistical part of the construction exercise. When we look at a composite 
indicator, say EPL, the first step involves assigning scores to the items. After that, a 
weighting scheme is designed. An analysis of sensitivity has to find out whether 
changes in the scoring or weighting system yield changes in the overall country 
ranking. Even though only a small number of ranks are changed, it can have an im-
pact on the outcome of an empirical analysis. Reviewing, replicating and revising 
existing indicators does not seem to be popular. However, it needs to be done in 
order to find out about an indicator's reliability. For the purpose of panel analyses, 
we need to have time series of the indicators. Above we discussed some, albeit not 
promising, approaches to tackle this problem. We, however, do not see another way 
than painstaking work to regularly update the indicators. Simply drawing a line be-
tween two data points cannot overcome the problem. 
A more specific issue regarding the quality of available indicators is the fact that 
most of them rely on formal provisions or model calculations. Hence, with some ex-
ceptions, they do not take the scope of application and the de facto implementation 
into account, e.g. the actual enforcement of dismissal protection or availability crite-
ria in unemployment protection. Since most of the indicators, apart from the survey-
based ones, are based on a de jure approach, they do not give information on 
whether and how the different rules are implemented or enforced. Whether the indi-
cators carry some degree of economic significance also does not become clear. 
Researchers should report numbers and results of the real relevance, coverage and 
implementation along with their indicators. “If a regulation [...] is not implemented, 
then it is not relevant” (Ochel 2005).  
The international comparison of institutions is further impaired by the fact that they 
evolve in different contexts. That means that if we use identical concepts to meas-
ure some phenomenon, this may give rise to false inferences. To overcome this 
problem, the notion of functional equivalence comes into play. It “refers to the re-
quirement that concepts should be related to other concepts in other settings in 
more or less the same way” (van Deth 1998).  
All indicators have been constructed pretty much in isolation to others. It seems that 
researchers have their favorite indicator that they use for empirical analysis. To look 
at an example, consider a young graduate who tries to enter the labor market. His 
reasons for not finding a job quickly are manifold. Some consider EPL and strict 
insider rules responsible, others see a high tax wedge that makes an employer re-
luctant to offer a job, and still others claim that the social security system with its 
negative impact on the reservation wage or the search effort is responsible. Some-
thing like an overall indicator that describes the labor market's flexibility does not yet 
seem in sight. Not a single institution in isolation hinders a young graduate from en- 
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  19 
tering the labor market quickly. There are a plethora of institutions that work with 
and against each other. To account for them seems to be the challenge. 
Hence, some path for future work on indicators could lie in the development of indi-
cators with a high “information content” that take into account the actual implemen-
tation and relevance for actors’ behavior. Given that institutions are not isolated from 
each other, the development of indicators should provide a reliable picture of the 
complex and multi-dimensional institutional environment that influences actors’ be-
havior in the labor market. However, one must then be aware of potential endogene-
ity problems.  
4  The period of strong growth 
Towards the end of the 1990s general conditions for econometric studies on the 
effects of LMI were favorable. “Supply-side conditions” had improved enormously. 
Gathering data no longer had the character of a Herculean task. The theoretical 
basis was solidly established. But there were also “demand-side” factors which 
spurred research activities. The then existing work had certainly provoked the wish 
for confirmation, but also for refutation. Besides, unemployment patterns across the 
OECD and in particular across Europe raised additional questions on the causes of 
unemployment. While on average unemployment remained high, some countries 
(e.g. the Netherlands and the UK) performed better than others. Differences in la-
bour market institutions were named as explanations for the divergent patterns and 
empirical work should prove this hypothesis.  
4.1  Emphasis on interactions 
The research question, titling an early version of their paper on “Unemployment and 
Labor Market Institutions: An Empirical Analysis” by Belot and van Ours (2001) was 
thus rather straightforward: “Does the recent success of some OECD countries in 
lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labour market 
reforms?” Taking up the point of possible interactions between different labour mar-
ket institutions, which had been already scrutinised to some extent by Elmeskov et 
al. (1998), Belot and van Ours were among the first to contribute to a quickly grow-
ing literature. Based on data from 18 OECD countries and seven five-year time 
spans, for which averages are constructed (NT=119), different panel models (fixed 
effects) are estimated. The basic set-up is very much in line with Nickell (1997); i.e. 
apart from the change in inflation only labor market institutions are used to explain 
standardized unemployment rates. An important result of this exercise is the impor-
tance of fixed effects. In a pooled regression all institutional variables are significant, 
in a fixed-effects model they are not. Adding interaction terms leads to more signifi-
cant coefficients. Belot and van Ours (2001) interestingly find strong interactions 
between taxes and the replacement rate. Their results also indicate that high union 
density only raises unemployment in economies with decentralized wage bargain- 
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ing. Finally they find evidence for a negatively signed interaction term of employ-
ment protection and decentralized bargaining. 
At the turn of the century another “interaction hypothesis” arose. While macroeco-
nomic variables had certainly been in the equation for a long time, it was only 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) who put forth the hypothesis that in order to under-
stand the evolution of unemployment across (European) countries and through time, 
the interaction of shocks and institutions has to be considered. Consequently their 
paper tries to show that only by interacting shocks and institutions satisfying esti-
mates can be obtained. While the econometric results do not reject the “institutions 
only” version, Blanchard and Wolfers quite convincingly argue their point. In a 
nonlinear specification combining three shock variables (TFP growth, real interest 
rate, a shift in labor demand) six out of eight labor market institutions show signifi-
cant correlations and seven out of eight the results expected. Active labor market 
policies are found to be insignificant as well as union coverage. Thus, according to 
Blanchard and Wolfers, even employment protection legislation, which has hardly 
been found to be significant, must be seen as a cause of unemployment. 
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) perform a quasi-evaluation of Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), but they also extend and modify the previous study. While their results are 
not as “nice,” they largely confirm the findings of Blanchard and Wolfers. An interest-
ing finding of their work is that 50 percent of the difference between unemployment 
rates in the United States and those in other countries (1970-1996) can be ex-
plained by a model containing shocks and institutions. In comparison, excluding 
institutions diminishes the ratio to 11 percent. The authors conclude that “a large 
proportion of the reversal of unemployment fortunes between the United States and 
the other OECD countries appears to be due to the interaction between the laissez-
faire institutions in the United States and the macroeconomic shocks of the 1980s 
and 1990s”. 
4.2  New work on mainly institutional explanations 
Around the same time as Blanchard and Wolfers, Fitoussi et al. (2000) came up with 
empirical work also relying on shocks and institutions. Their approach to institutions 
differs from most of the previous papers by adopting a two-step strategy. They first 
run regressions where unemployment rates are explained by macroeconomic vari-
ables and fixed effects. The adjustment to shocks is country specific. The estimates 
for both the fixed effects and the ‘sensitivity-to-shocks’ parameters are then ex-
plained in a second step by country-specific variables for unemployment benefits, 
trade union strength and active labor market policies. All variables show the ex-
pected signs. In a second step, Fitoussi et al. first estimate “pure” institution models. 
While institutions can explain the heterogeneity in unemployment rates across coun-
tries in the 1980s, they fail to explain changes in unemployment from the 1980s to 
the 1990s. Adding macroeconomic shocks to the institutions makes coefficient esti- 
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mates for union density and union coordination significant, leading Fitoussi et al. to 
conclusions similar to those of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
In two papers, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2003) and Nickell, Nunziata 
and Ochel (2005) argue the case for the sole importance of institutions. Extending 
previous work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Nickell (1997) and Nickell 
and Layard (1999), they regress institutional and shock variables on standardized 
unemployment and employment rates. Their estimated models for unemployment 
use time series from 1960 to 1995 and include the lagged unemployment rate as an 
explanatory variable. The baseline and preferred specification contains institutional 
variables (some of them interacted) and measures of macroeconomic shocks such 
as labor demand, TFP and real import price shocks. The estimates for all institutions 
are significant and correctly signed, except for employment protection and total em-
ployment taxes, which are insignificant. By comparing the basic model with an en-
riched model containing interaction terms between time dummies (representing 
shocks) and institutions, they find that “the interacted time effects are, first, [jointly] 
insignificant and second make no contribution to the overall rise unemployment.” 
Whether this research strategy actually allows the conclusion that interactions do 
not contribute to the explanation of the evolution of OECD unemployment appears 
questionable. Nickell et al. neither discuss their dynamic modeling strategy of includ-
ing the lagged independent variable nor do they try to explain why in Blanchard and 
Wolfers’ work the interactions of shocks and institutions have such importance. 
4.3  Critical work 
In a series of papers (Baker et al. 2004, 2005, Howell et. al 2007), Baker et al. criti-
cally review all studies that have been discussed so far. Starting from the alternative 
hypothesis that labor market institutions are not responsible for high unemployment 
rates, they try to assess the robustness and reliability of the macro-econometric evi-
dence. Their main conclusion of the exercise is that the effects of institutions on 
unemployment are distinctly shaky with widely divergent coefficients and levels of 
significance. They go on to argue that the latest work by the OECD (2006) basically 
confirms the lack of robustness in panel studies.  
To highlight the work by Baker et al., we give two examples of their experiments. In 
the 2002 paper, Nickell’s (1997) model is re-estimated using data from Nickell et al. 
(2001). While in Nickell’s paper seven out of eight institutional variables were signifi-
cant, in Baker et al. there are none. In another paper (2004), the IMF study (2003) is 
analyzed at length. One issue explored is the correct modeling approach to unem-
ployment dynamics, a topic also implicitly dealt with by Nickell et al. (2003, 2005) by 
including the lagged dependent variable. By replacing country-specific time trends in 
the IMF specification and, probably much more important, replacing some of the 
series of the institutional variables by (slightly) revised versions, the coefficient esti-
mates all become insignificant. Finally, Baker et al. (2004) chose a different set of 
interaction terms. Altogether these changes result in almost completely insignificant  
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coefficient estimates. Unfortunately, Baker et al. do not justify the changes in the 
econometric model. 
The contributions by Baker et al. are highly valuable for understanding and evaluat-
ing the prevailing studies. They are right in pointing out that practically none of the 
major studies contains comprehensive specification tests or other measures to 
check their robustness. Most of the time, only the ‘preferred’ or best-fitting models 
are presented without discussing the problems that were encountered in the estima-
tion process. While this problem is certainly not confined to macro-econometric work 
on labor market institutions, it appears highly debatable whether policy advice on 
reforming labor markets could be based on “fragile” econometric results. Thus the 
question is, as Blanchard (2006) puts, “Do we really know enough to give advice?” 
Baker et al. conclude that there is no convincing evidence for the “orthodox” case. 
While they certainly have a point in asking for robustness, it appears questionable 
whether their approaches to test for robustness are adequate. 
Concentrating on econometric specification, Baccaro and Rei (2005) estimate mod-
els in the style of the IMF (2003). Using the data set of Baker et al., which in turn is 
built on the institutional data set by Nickell and Nunziata (2001), they particularly 
discuss the right approach to dynamic modeling. Leaving aside the details of an 
interesting set of alternative ways to deal with serial correlation, their main result is 
that none of their models lends support to the “orthodox” view. There are two issues 
of specification, which in our review deserve further notice. One is the inclusion of 
country-specific time trends, the other is cointegration. With respect to the former, 
Baccaro and Rei do not see any justification for country-specific time trends. Their 
replication of the IMF’s (2003) study, however, suggests that it is just this element of 
the model that makes the difference. According to Baccaro and Rei the time series 
used are mostly non-stationary and first-order tests for cointegration suggest the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship. Baccaro and Rei therefore decide to esti-
mate (dynamic) models in differences. They also discuss alternative approaches, 
among them some ad hoc tools like the insertion of country-specific time trends, 
which they do not recognize as appropriate, since “we do not want to control for 
trends. If anything we would like to explain them through our model.” Summarizing 
tables 4-6, no clear picture in support of the “deregulatory view” emerges. With the 
exception of union density, which has a significant positive effect on unemployment 
in most of the models, the rest of the institutional variables shows only sporadic 
signs of significance. 
5  Most recent approaches  
Also dealing heavily with alternative estimation techniques Amable, Demmou, Gatti 
(2006) contribute to the debate on robustness. Taking up the issue of slow, if at all 
changing institutional variables, they apply fixed effects vector decomposition 
(FEVD) estimators as well Beck and Katz’s (1995) method to compute panel cor- 
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rected standard errors (PCSE). While the latter does not make a big difference to 
the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimators used otherwise, the FEVD 
estimates produce significant coefficients for almost all explanatory variables. Am-
able et al. follow Nickell et al. (2003, 2005) and estimate dynamic models, including 
the lagged dependent variable, on yearly data from 1980 to 2004. Their results ba-
sically confirm the importance of labor market institutions as important determinants 
of unemployment. In particular, they find significant positive effects of union density 
and taxes on labor. Product market regulation is always found to increase unem-
ployment. Wage bargaining coordination as well as, surprisingly, employment pro-
tection decreases unemployment. 
5.1  New OECD work 
Bassanini and Duval (2006), in a paper which underlies Chapter 7 of the OECD 
Employment Outlook 2006, use new indicators, different lengths of time series and 
alternative specifications in order to “reassess the role of policies and institutions.” 
Their work also takes up the reproach of the lack of robustness in estimations. The 
checks include different choices of the estimation samples, alternative model speci-
fications and estimation techniques. None of these alterations leads to changes in 
the main findings. The first set of models, which consists of equations in levels, 
where apart from the institutional variables the output gap enters, confirms the ex-
pected effects of institutions on unemployment. Employment protection and union 
density are the only insignificant variables of the different models. 
Bassanini and Duval then go on to test specific and systemic interactions among 
institutions. In this context, it is important to note that the inclusion of all combina-
tions of institutions is not feasible, since degrees of freedom are simply too small. 
Thus the choice of interaction terms is always arbitrary in a sense. Overall the mod-
els presented lead to the conclusion that there is evidence for systemic interactions, 
but not for specific interactions, with the exception of unemployment benefits and 
spending on active labor market policies. This combination of institutions decreases 
unemployment, probably because higher spending on active labor market policies 
means stronger activation efforts.  
Bassanini and Duval also take up the topic of “shocks and institutions.” In the spirit 
of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), they use their data sets to estimate equations in-
cluding unobserved shocks. These shocks are modeled as common time dummies 
for all countries. In order to capture at least part of the important macroeconomic 
shocks of the 1970s, the previously used timed series are prolonged backwards, 
covering a time span from 1970 (1975) to 2003. With four institutions entered, the 
coefficients of the average replacement rate, the tax wedge and high corporatism 
are found to be significant and correctly signed. Bassanini and Duval take them as 
“evidence that direct and indirect effects of policies and institutions complement 
each other in explaining unemployment trends.” The same holds for a second set of 
regressions, where the unobserved shocks are replaced by the observed shock  
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variables: TFP, terms of trade, interest rates and labor demand. Despite the signifi-
cant estimates of the shocks and institution models Bassanini and Duval (2006) see 
their contribution more in line with Nickell (1997) and Nickell et al. (2003, 2005), 
stressing that “changes in policies and institutions appear to explain almost two-
thirds of non-cyclical unemployment.” However, the effects of adverse shocks are 
amplified by high unemployment benefits and a low degree of corporatism. 
5.2  One or two peaks? 
While these options can be integrated into the well-established theoretical frame-
work laid out above, other researchers, mainly from the social sciences, but also 
from an economic background, have questioned the idea that there is only one suc-
cessful policy setting in terms of superior labor market performance. Starting from 
the observation that institutional factors do not work in isolation but form complex 
institutional arrangements, they construct typologies of employment systems with 
internal coherence and assume that diverging, but coherent models could have po-
tentially equal capacities to generate favorable employment outcomes, albeit with a 
different internal economic logic. Most important in this respect were the typologies 
of welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990), the varieties of capitalism approach by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Albert’s (1993) and Amable’s (2003) work on diversity 
in modern capitalism. This strand of literature basically argues that different institu-
tional configurations can be equally successful in terms of economic activity and 
productivity while relying on diverging patterns of economic specialization that are 
stabilized by dense and coherent institutional networks, in particular labor market 
regulation, welfare state provisions, training and wage setting arrangements. The 
set of labor market institutions used in this type of research is mostly identical to that 
used in economics (Scharpf/Schmidt 2000), but this approach is more open to ac-
cept divergence of institutional patterns and reform paths. The labor market is struc-
tured by institutional settings in the productive system, and diverging institutional 
arrangements on the labor market are associated with specific national patterns of 
labor market adaptation. 
Recent research into alternative regimes has in particular pointed at different mod-
els of insurance against labor market risks through strict employment protection or 
generous unemployment benefits which could also be complemented by effective 
reintegration-oriented labor market policies (Boeri/Conde-Ruiz/Galasso 2003, Eich-
horst/Konle-Seidl 2006). This is related to the idea that different forms of flexibility 
and security can be facilitated by diverging institutional arrangements (see e.g. 
Wilthagen/Tros 2004), an idea which has become a prominent feature of some em-
pirical work and European policy initiatives under the label of “flexicurity.” Hence, 
institutional settings generate national patterns of labor market flexibility that com-
bine different dimensions of flexibility (functional flexibility, external numerical flexi-
bility, internal numerical flexibility and wage flexibility) as well as security (job secu-
rity, employment security, income security). Most recently, the OECD also empha- 
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sized the institutional feasibility and actual existence of at least two different models 
of superior employment performance (OECD 2006) that allude to the often cited 
dualism between “liberal” or “Anglo-Saxon” models of flexibility and “corporatist” 
regimes. Hence, not all successful countries are necessarily “liberal” market econo-
mies. In a similar fashion Freeman and Schettkat (2000) argued that homogenous 
skill levels across the labor force limit the pressure for wage dispersion so that effec-
tive training schemes based in part on corporatist arrangements can be substitutes 
for high wage flexibility in decentralized bargaining systems.  
But there is another, much more profound explanation: the potential existence of 
different peaks of superior labor market performance. In general, one can argue that 
this type of research is less suitable for regression analysis since it most often relies 
on complex institutional analyses with strong qualitative evidence, which can be 
seen as less rigorous in empirical terms (Howell et al. 2007, Scharpf/Schmidt 2000, 
Schettkat 2003).  
There have, though, been some advances in the direction of quantitative analysis. 
Amable (2003) and Hall/Gingerich (2004) probably represent the most prominent 
examples. Both Hall/Gingerich and Amable show a positive correlation between 
institutional coherence embodied in either liberal, market coordinated systems or 
strategically coordinated economies and economic growth or other outcome vari-
ables such as productivity and inventions. Institutional coherence is measured in 
terms of an aggregate coordination index based on specific institutional variables 
developed by Hall and Gingerich (2004). They take the two extremes as “pure” 
models of liberal or coordinated market economies. Relying on OECD indicators, 
Amable identifies the coordinated model as a second peak besides the liberal sys-
tem in terms of low unemployment. Although EPL drives unemployment in his 
model, coordination in industrial relations, public education and welfare state size 
reduce it. These factors also eliminate the potential negative effects of EPL and 
product market regulation. Hence, he suggests a dual peak model with liberal sys-
tems on the one hand and coordinated economies with strong welfare states on the 
other.  
In nearly the same fashion, the OECD most recently argued – based on principal 
component analysis – that two models of superior labor market performance exist in 
OECD countries, with one group of countries having low unemployment benefits, 
taxes and EPL, and the second group achieving broadly similar outcomes, i.e. high 
employment and low unemployment, with a fully fledged system of benefits, active 
labor market policies and corporatist cooperation as long as this is interacting with a 
flexible labor market. The stronger role of the welfare states in corporatist, mostly 
Northern European systems, however, means that taxes are higher, yet the distribu-
tion of incomes is less unequal than in liberal economies. In contrast to the varieties 
of capitalism literature, however, the OECD sees coordinated economies in Conti-
nental Europe not as successful but, rather, as problematic in terms of labor market  
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performance as they are associated with a passive welfare state and heavily regu-
lated employment protection (OECD 2006).  
6  What Do We Know? What Should We Know? 
Over the last two decades there has been considerable progress toward more com-
plex institutional explanations taking a larger number of institutions and interactions 
between institutions into account while at the same time emphasizing the dynamic 
aspect of labor market adaptation to a changing economic environment. There has 
been considerable development regarding both the construction of aggregate insti-
tutional indicators and empirical macro-econometric research into the determinants 
of employment performance (Arpaia/Mourre 2005) if we take Nickell’s (1997) influ-
ential paper as the starting point. Data sets have grown as has the number of stud-
ies. A lot of effort has been put into better, at least more detailed, time series for 
labor market institutions. Additional covariates have been tested. Important econo-
metric issues, such as dealing with the peculiarities of the institutional variables and 
cointegration, have been discussed. Robustness has been an issue, at least since 
Baker et al. (2002) started their critical work. Thus a lot of scientific effort has been 
put into the quest for empirical evidence on the effects of labor market institutions.  
Summarizing the existing theoretical work on comparing national labor markets, 
there is now a strong argument in favor of a dynamic and interactive framework that 
conceives labor markets as determined by a complex set of institutions that not only 
determine the adaptive potential of the labor market, but also form different patterns 
of labor market flexibility. Adaptability, in this framework, means the capacity of labor 
markets to adjust to structural changes or business cycle variations. If labor market 
institutions work in the right direction, unemployment persistence will be low and 
employment high, whereas a less-favorable institutional arrangement will result in 
persistent unemployment and structural problems in the labor market. Labor market 
reforms to enhance labor market adaptability should help overcome these structural 
problems. 
There is good reason to argue that there are different channels of flexibility on the 
labor market, which can – at least partly – be substitutes for each other, i.e. be seen 
as functional equivalents so that not all parameters have to be close to the market 
optimum in order to achieve a functioning labor market. One core element is the 
relative role of flexibility/security provisions embedded in employment protection, 
wage setting and active and passive labor market policies, i.e. the diverging role of 
public intervention with respect to dismissal protection, wage floors, training and 
other labor market policies to counter potential disincentive effects arising from more 
generous benefits. Functional equivalence allows for different models of good em-
ployment performance – even if some policy areas are characterized by some sort 
of “rigidity” – as long as they can be compensated for by other elements of flexibility. 
Different modes of adaptation can lead to a similar amount of overall adaptability so  
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that there can be not only more than one peak of labor market performance, but also 
different reform paths. However, the benefits of alternative institutional patterns are 
associated with specific costs in terms of taxes or inequality, for instance.  
Given the co-evolution of empirical research and institutional indicators (as well as 
facts and ideas), we can now see a broad analytical consensus on the role of institu-
tions, interactions between institutions and, last but not least, between institutions 
and shocks so that a dynamic and interactive framework can be seen as widely ac-
cepted. Most empirical studies converge at least to the point that the majority of the 
regressions – despite major differences in the models – show significant results for 
core labor market institutions, interactions and shocks, and mostly in the expected 
way.  
However, most studies only report “preferred” results. Hence, whereas many re-
searchers agree that institutions and institutional reforms explain a significant part of 
cross-country differences in labor market performance, it is hard to single out the 
most relevant variables in terms of particular institutions or interactions in an unam-
biguous way. To a certain extent, empirical findings vary depending on the model 
specifications, the countries and period covered and the variables used. The review 
of the empirical studies also shows that robust correlations between individual insti-
tutional variables and labor markets are hard to identify. The same is true for pat-
terns of institutional interactions or interaction between shocks and institutions. 
Hence, while the theoretical argument is convincing, empirical evidence is less 
clear. 
We thus conclude that we do not really know which institutions and which interac-
tions have a substantial influence on labor market outcomes. Findings from one 
study can be neutralized by findings from other studies. Hence, the robustness of 
empirical findings is still under debate. The series of studies that is now available 
does not lead to unambiguous empirical findings regarding significant correlations 
between individual institutional variables and labor market outcomes. This lack of 
confidence also holds for attempts at identifying the beneficial effects of institutional 
configurations that represent different types of labor markets or economic systems. 
While there is evidence in favor of the “single peak” model, the “twin peak” alterna-
tive cannot unambiguously be ruled out. There certainly is some evidence in support 
of the “deregulatory view” but it is not very difficult to come up with empirical esti-
mates that reject this view. Notwithstanding the vast research effort, the case has to 
be recognized as largely unsolved. Given this uncertainty, it does not seem appro-
priate to make strong statements on the role of individual institutional variables and 
potential policy recommendations based solely upon macro-econometric studies. 
What we have learned is that the empirical evidence is uncertain and that real proc-
esses within the labor market are more complex than originally assumed.  
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One has, however, to bear in mind the very nature of empirical research. If we agree 
that causal effects cannot be defined outside theory (Heckman 2005), then we 
should not expect irrefutable results in an absolute sense from empirical work. To 
put it differently, in the spirit of Karl Popper: There is no verification of theory, only 
falsification. It is thus basically up to the researcher to decide, whether the empirical 
evidence on labor market institutions falsifies the “deregulatory view” or alternative 
theories.  
Criticism with respect to a “lack of robustness” is often uttered. While the request for 
robust specifications is certainly legitimate, one has to be aware of its meaning in 
macro-econometrics. Here it is rather common that minor changes to “nice” empiri-
cal models can produce quite tremendous changes of the parameter estimates. Be-
sides, the notion of robustness, at least in a very broad sense, is not well defined. A 
significant part of the critique is raising very general points, even touching the phi-
losophy of science. It is hard to see, how any econometric model can either be ir-
refutably verified or falsified. Thus there is always the question of what actually con-
stitutes evidence and what does not. Here again, it is finally up to the researcher to 
assess the existing information. There is, however, no absolute criterion for the ac-
ceptance or rejection of specific results. 
Some issues for future research remain. First, the role of interactions between insti-
tutions is still not clarified enough in econometric terms. Available studies and theo-
retical contributions point at a potential value added from deeper analysis of institu-
tional interactions – in particular when it comes to diverging patterns of labor market 
adaptability. Empirical research in this direction is not yet conclusive. More specifi-
cally, the potential expected from interaction models has not materialized in a robust 
and theoretically convincing way thus far. However, available evidence seems to 
suggest that different models of superior employment performance are possible and 
that it is not the presence of protective mechanisms as such that causes persistent 
economic problems, but rather an inappropriate institutional setting that allows only 
for an insufficient amount of adaptation on the labor market. In particular there 
seems to be a dualism between liberal, market-oriented arrangements and corpora-
tist ones. Yet, the debate between “single peak” and “twin peak” advocates is still 
open. By the same token, one might argue that a simple linear model of causal rela-
tions between single institutions and labor market outcomes is not suitable given the 
complex relationship between institutions and the labor market.  
Second, despite the fact that considerable resources have been devoted to the de-
velopment of quantitative institutional indicators over the last two decades, the set of 
available indicators is still far from being completely reliable and satisfying as they 
basically represent formal regulations or model calculations. The improvements on 
the indicator side have not necessarily contributed to more robust empirical findings 
yet. This may have to do with the fact that we do not know enough about the actual 
meaning of institutions in practice and the way they influence actors’ behavior.  
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Hence, there is some room for better indicators with a higher “information content” 
regarding the scope and actual application of formal provisions and with respect to 
potential functional equivalents. This in particular could help formulate policy advice 
as indicators available so far are often rather broad and “stylized” so that specific 
need for institutional reform cannot be derived.  
Still, explaining cross-country differences in labor market outcomes is a major objec-
tive of theoretical and empirical work in economics. Currently policy making will be 
informed by more or less reliable statements on reasons why there are differences 
in labor market functioning across countries. Hence, future work should improve the 
empirical knowledge on explanations for diverging employment profiles in national 
labor markets not only for academic, but also for practical reasons. Given the fact 
that it is never possible to confirm or reject specific hypotheses definitively, it would 
not be realistic to expect totally unambiguous results form empirical work. Yet, we 
could try to make some steps forward. Against this background, three major points 
emerge:  
1. Further work should be devoted to the theoretical refinement of interactions be-
tween the different institutions that influence the labor market and between insti-
tutions and the economic environment in order to inform empirical work with sub-
stantial hypotheses. Up to now, most work on interactions was basically induc-
tive, but not based on strong theoretical arguments. In that sense, we need a 
systematic theory of channels of adaptation and the relevant institutional envi-
ronment.  
2. Additional work seems necessary regarding the substance of quantitative indica-
tors on labor market institutions in order to improve our understanding of the ac-
tual role or the “real meaning” and relevance of institutions. In particular, this calls 
for supplementing existing indicators with information on the implementation or 
enforcement of formal provisions (e.g. availability criteria, dismissal protection), 
the scope of application, i.e. coverage, and potential functional equivalents.  
3. We could benefit from having a comprehensive set of quantitative indicators on 
institutional provisions that influence different dimensions of labor market 
adaptability or flexibility. This could help map national patterns of labor market 
flexibility. In practical terms, this means selecting individual elements and com-
bining them in a theoretically and empirically sound way. This is possible by 
building upon existing indicators and databases on reforms although some empty 
space will have to be filled. Time series information would allow for the tracking of 
changes over time that stem from institutional reforms. It might be possible to 
achieve, with reasonable simplification, a more comprehensive set of indicator of 
labor market adaptability combining different dimensions of flexibility.   
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  30 
References 
Addison, J./Grosso, J. (1996): Job Security Provisions and Employment: Revised 
Estimates. Industrial Relations 35, 4, 585-603. 
Albert, M. (1993): Capitalism Against Capitalism. London.  
Algoé Consultants/Alphametrics (2002): The construction of an index of labour mar-
ket adaptability for EU Member States. Report of a study funded by the European 
Commission and directed by Algoé Consultants in conjunction with Alphametrics 
Limited.  
Allard, G. (2005a): Measuring Job Security Over Time: In Search of a Historical In-
dicator.  
Allard, G. (2005b): Measuring the Changing Generosity of Unemployment Benefits: 
Beyond Existing Indicators.  
Amable, B. (2003): The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford.  
Amable, B./Demmou, L./Gatti, D. (2006): Institutions, unemployment and inactivity in 
the OECD countries, PSE Working Paper No. 2006-16.  
Amable, B./Demmou, L./Gatti, D. (2007): Employment Performance and Institutions: 
New Answers to an Old Question. IZA Discussion Paper 2731.  
Arpaia, A./Mourre, G. (2005): Labour Market Institutions and Labour Market Per-
formance: A Survey of the Literature. European Economy 238, December 2005. 
Baccaro, L./Rei, D. (2005): Institutional determinants of unemployment in OECD 
countries: A time series cross-section analysis. International Institute for Labour 
Studies Discussion Paper DP 160/2005, Geneva.  
Baker, D./Glyn, A./Howell, D./Schmitt, J. (2004): Unemployment and Labor Market 
Institutions: The Failure of the Empirical Case for Deregulation. CEPA Working Pa-
per 2004.  
Baker, D./Glyn, A./Howell, D./Schmitt, J. (2005): Labor Market Institutions and Un-
employment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence. In D. Howell 
(Ed.), Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York  
Bassanini, A. P./Duval, R. (2006): Employment patterns in OECD countries: Reas-
sessing the role of policies and institutions. OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper 486.  
Beck, N./Katz, J. (1995): What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series-Cross-Section 
Data in Comparative Politics, APSR 89 (3), September 1995, 634-47. 
Belot, M.V.K./van Ours, J.C. (2001): Unemployment and Labour Market Institutions, 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economics 15, 403-418. 
Bertola, G./Blau, F.D./Kahn, L.M. (2002): Comparative Analysis of Labor Market 
Outcomes: Lessons for the US from International Long-Run Evidence, in: Krieger, 
A./Solow, R. (Eds.), The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained?, 
Russell Sage and Century Foundations, 159-218. 
Bertola, G./Boeri, T./Cazes, S. (2000): Employment Protection in Industrialized 
Countries: The Case of New Indicators. International Labour Review 139, 1, 57-72.   
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  31 
Blanchard, O. (2006): European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts and Ideas. 
Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 45, 5-59. 
Blanchard, O./Wolfers J. (2000): The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of 
European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence. The Economic Journal, March 
2000, vol. 110, no. 462, 1-33. 
Boeri, T./Conde-Ruiz, J.I./Galasso, V. (2003): Protecting Against Labour Market 
Risk: Employment Protection or Unemployment Benefits. IGIER Working Papier 
239.  
Brandt, N./Burniaux, J.-M./Duval, R. (2005): Assessing the OECD Jobs Strategy, 
OECD Economics Working Paper 429, Paris. 
Bratt, C. (1996): Labor Relations in 18 Countries, Swedish Employment Confedera-
tion, Stockholm. 
Carone, G./Immervoll, H./Paturot, D./Salomäki, A. (2004): Indicators of Unemploy-
ment and Low-Wage Traps: Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Employment Incomes. 
OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Paper 18. 
Danish Ministry of Finance (1998): Availability criteria in selected OECD-countries. 
Danish Ministry of Finance Working Paper 6. 
De Haan, J./Sturm, J./Volkering, B. (2003): How to measure the Tax Burden on  
Labour at the Macro-Level. CESifo Working Paper 963. 
Ebbinghaus, B./Visser, J. (2000): The Societies of Europe: Trade Unions in Western 
Europe since 1945, London.  
Eichhorst, W./Konle-Seidl, R. (2006): The Interaction of Labor Market Regulation 
and Labor Market Policies in Welfare State Reform. Comparative Labor Law and 
Policy Journal 28, 1, 1-41.  
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990): The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton.  
Elmeskov, J./Martin, J.P./Scarpetta, S. (1998): Key Lessons for Labour Market Re-
forms: Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences, Economic Council of Sweden, 
Stockholm.  
Fitoussi, J.-P./Jestaz, D./Phelps, E.S./Zoega, G. (2000): Roots of the Recent Re-
coveries : Labor Market Reforms or Private Sector Forces? Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1, 237-291.  
Freeman, R.B./Schettkat, R. (2000): Skill Compression, Wage Differentials and  
Employment: Germany vs. the US. NBER Working Paper 7610.  
Grubb, D./Wells, W. (1993): Employment Regulation and Patterns of Work in EC 
Countries, OECD Economic Studies 21. 
Hall, P.A./Soskice, D. (Eds.) (2001): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foun-
dations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford.  
Hall, P. A./Soskice, D. (2001): An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In: Hall, P. 
A./Soskice, D. (Eds.) (2001): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, 1-68. 
Hall, P. A./Gingerich, D. W. (2004): Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Com-
plementarities in the Macroeconomy. An Empirical Analysis. MPIfG Discussion  
Paper 04/5.  
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  32 
Hasselpflug, S. (2005): Availability criteria in 25 countries. Ministry of Finance Den-
mark Working Paper 12/2005. Copenhagen. 
Heckman, J.J. (2005): The Scientific Model of Causality, Sociological Methodology 
35, 1-98. 
Howell, D.R./Baker, D./Glyn, A./Schmitt, J. (2007): Are Protective Labor Market In-
stitutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence, Capital-
ism and Society 2 (1). 
Immervoll, H. (2004): Average and Marginal Effective Tax Rates Facing Workers in 
the EU. A Micro-Level Analysis of Levels, Distributions and Driving Factors. 
EUROMOD Working Paper No. EM6/04 
IMF (2003): Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: Why Reforms Pay Off, 
World Economic Outlook, ch. 4, 129-150.  
Iversen, T. (1999): Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconom-
ics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge University Press. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2003): Unemployment and Labor Market Institu-
tions: Why Reforms Pay Off. Washington D.C. 
Kenworthy, L. (2001): Wage-setting measures: a survey and assessment. In: World 
Politics 54 (1), 57-98. 
Lazear, E. P. (1990): Job Security Provisions and Employment. In: Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 105, 699-726. 
Layard, R./Nickell, S./Jackman, R. (1991): Unemployment. Macroeconomic Per-
formance and the Labour Market, Oxford.  
McCallum, J. (1983): Inflation and Social Consensus in the Seventies. Economic 
Journal 93, 784-805. 
McKee, M./Visser, J./Saunders, P. (1986): Marginal tax rates on the use of labour 
and capital in OECD countries. OECD Economic Studies 7. 
Nardo, M., et al. (2005): Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Method-
ology and User Guide. OECD Statistics Directorate. 
Nickell, S. (1997): Unemployment and Labour Market Rigidities: Europe versus 
North America. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 3, 55-74. 
Nickell, S. (2003): Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment in OECD Coun-
tries, CESifo DICE Report 2/2003, 13-26. 
Nickell, S./Layard, R. (1999): Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance, 
in: Ashenfelter, O./Card, D. (Eds.): Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 3 C, 3029-
3084. 
Nickell, S./Nunziata, L. (2001): Labour Market Institutions Database.  
Nickell, S./Nunziata, L./Ochel, W./Quintini, G. (2003): The Beveridge Curve, Unem-
ployment and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s. Aghion, P./Fryd-
man, R./Stiglitz, J./Woodford, M. (Eds.): Knowledge, Information and Expectations  
in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps. Princeton University 
Press. 
Nickell, S./Nunziata, L./Ochel, W. (2005): Unemployment in the OECD since the 
1960s. What do We Know?, The Economic Journal 115 (500), 2005, 01-27.   
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  33 
Ochel, W. (2005): Concepts and Measurement of Labour Market Institutions. CESifo 
DICE Report 4/2005, 40-55.  
Oswald, A. (1996): A Conjecture on the Explanation of High Unemployment in In-
dustrialized Nations: Part I. Warwick Economics Research Paper 475. 
OECD, annual editions: Taxing Wages, Paris. 
OECD, annual editions: Benefits and Wages, Paris.  
OECD (1994a): The OECD Jobs Study – Facts, Analysis, Strategies. Paris.  
OECD (1994b): OECD Employment Outlook 1994, Paris. 
OECD (1997a): Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy: Member Countries’ Experi-
ence, Paris. 
OECD (1997b): OECD Employment Outlook 1997, Paris.  
OECD (1999): OECD Employment Outlook 1999, Paris.  
OECD (2004): OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Paris.  
OECD (2006): OECD Employment Outlook 2006, Paris.  
Scarpetta, S. (1996): Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional 
settings on unemployment: a cross country study', OECD Economic Studies, No. 26 
1996/1, 43-97. 
Scharpf, F. W./Schmidt, V. A. (Eds.) (2000): Welfare and Work in the Open Econ-
omy, 2 Vol., Oxford.  
Schettkat, R. (2003): Institutions in the Economic Fitness Landscape: What Impact 
do Welfare State Institutions have on Economic Performance, IZA Discussion Paper 
696.  
Scruggs, L. (2006): The Generosity of Social Insurance. In: Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy 22 (3), 349-364.  
Soskice, D. (1990): Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Ad-
vanced Industrialized Countries. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6, 4, 36-61. 
Sutherland, H. (2001): EUROMOD: An Integrated European Benefit-Tax Model. 
EUROMOD Working Paper, No. EM9/01. 
Traxler, F./Blaschke, S./Kittel, B. (2001): National Labour Relations in International-
ized Markets. A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change, and Performance, Ox-
ford.  
Van Deth, J. (1998): Equivalence in Comparative Political Research. In: Van Deth, 
J. (ed.): Comparative Politics: The Problem of Equivalence, New York.  
Visser, J. (2006): Union membership statistics in 24 countries. Monthly Labor Re-
view 129, 1. 
Vroman, W. (2007): Replacement Rates and UC Benefit Generosity. Mimeo, Urban 
Institute, Washington DC.  
Wilthagen, T./Tros, F. (2004): The concept of ‘flexicurity’: a new approach to regulat-
ing employment and labour markets. Transfer 2/04, 166-186.  
  
IAB-Discussion Paper 22/2008  34 
Table 1 
Survey of studies 
Dependent variable: standardized unemployment rate 
Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Table 1.2, column 1:  
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Table 1.5, column 2 (systemic 
interactions):  
BRR, TW, EPL, UD, PMR, High 
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Interactions between single institu-
tions and the overall institutional 
framework:  
BRR, TW, UD, PMR, Output gap 
OECD data:   N = 20  T = 24 
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Table 1.2:  
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and EPL 
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FEVD, country 
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all significant 
except for TTB 
 
 
Independent variables include:  
Institutional variables: UB = Unemployment Benefits, BRR = benefit replacement rate, BD = benefit duration, CENTR = centralization of collective bargaining, COOR = co- 
ordination of wage bargaining, COVER = union coverage, UD = union density, EPL = employment protection, ALMP = public spending on active labor market policies, TAX = 
 taxes on labor, TW = tax wedge, EMPCOOR = employer co-ordination, PMR = product market regulation, CBI = central bank independence.  
Macroeconomic variables: LD = labor demand shock, TFP = total factor productivity shock, RIP = real import price shock, MS = money supply shock, RER = real exchange  
rate, RIR = real interest rate, FA = financial assets, Credit = rate of domestic credit to GDP, TTB = trend of trade balance. 
 
 
* All signs as expected by standard economic theory, unless explicitly mentioned. 
** Table 5 in Nickell et al. (2005) is identical to Table 13 in Nickell et al. (2003).  
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